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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CASE NO. 960745-CA
vs.
Priority No. 2
CARL WILLIAM SCALES,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF QF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION QF THE COURT QF APPEALS
This is an appeal from a final judgment and conviction and
commitment after convictions for Murder, a first degree felony, and
five (5) counts of Theft, all second degree felonies.

Appellant

filed his Notice of Appeal with the trial court on September 9,
1996.

Jurisdiction is proper in either the Utah Supreme Court (78-

2-2(3)(I)
Appeals.

Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), or the Utah Court of
Thereafter, the appeal was lodged with the Utah Supreme

Court, which poured the case over to the Utah Court of Appeals,

pursuant to its vested authority to do so.

Jurisdiction is

conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2) (j );
1953 as amended.
STATEMENT QF THE ISSUES
A.

Did the trial court err in not severing the murder count

from the theft counts?1
Standard of Review: The Appellate Court reviews the trial
court's decision denying appellant's Motion to Sever Counts by an
abuse of discretion standard.

State v. Straderr 902 P.2d 638 (Ut.

App. 1995).
B.

Was appellant denied right to effective assistance of

counsel?2
Standard of Review: Since this claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the Court
must

decide whether appellant was deprived

assistance of counsel as a matter of law.

of the effective

State v. Tennysonr 850

P.2d 461, 466 (Ut. App. 1993).

x

The motion was argued before the trial court on June 10,
See Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, June 10, 1996.

1996.
2

New counsel was substituted for purposes of preparing this
appeal, pursuant to Notice of Substitution of Counsel, filed with
Utah Supreme Court on November 7, 1996.

2

C.

Did the Court err in failing to obtain a knowing and

intelligent waiver of appellant's right to counsel?
Standard of Review:

A trial court's conclusions of law in

criminal cases are reviewed for correctness, State v. Thurmanr
846P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1973).

Additionally, appellate courts

will review the sufficiency of the trial court's findings of fact
for correctness. State v- Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1981).
The appellate court decides the matter for itself with no deference
to the trial court's determination of law. State v. Delir 861 P.2d
431, 433 (Utah 1993).
D.

Was there sufficient evidence to convict appellant?

Standard of Review: The evidence and all inferences which may
be reasonably drawn from it will be reviewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury.

State v, Alvarezr 872 P.2d

45Q (Utah, 1994),
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The following constitutional provisions and rules are relevant
to the issues presented:

Article I, Section 12, Utah State Constitution;
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel.

3

Amendment VI, United States Constitution
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense,

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Rule 9.5.
court.

Charged multiple offenses - To be filed in single

(1)
(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations,
or informations charging multiple offenses, which may include
violations of state law, county ordinances, or municipal ordinances
and arising from a single criminal episode as defined by Section
76-1-401, shall be filed in a single court that has jurisdiction of
the charged offense with the highest possible penalty of all the
offenses charged.
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or
information may not be separated except by order of the court and
for good cause shown.
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended):
Title 76-1-401: "Single criminal episode" defined - Joinder
of offenses and defendants.
In this part
definition, "single
closely related in
accomplishment of a

unless the context requires a different
criminal episode" means all conduct which is
time and is incident to an attempt or an
single criminal objective.
STATEMENT QF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case!

This

is

an

appeal

from

a

Judgment

and

Commitment

convicting Appellant following a trial by jury, of the offenses of
Murder, a first degree felony, and five (5) counts of Theft, all

4

second

degree

IHIIUII*"

1M*I

11

I li i

II« i i i n r a I I I *j I ' l i l

III

Hi ic-m

ii

luilcft"

of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County,
State of Utah.
Course Q£ JEroceeflinga:

11,

Appellant was tried, before a jury, Iin Summit County and
convicted of the offenses of Murder

a i::i i: s I: d e g r e e

vinlr-iti in of I J tall Code Ann. 76-5-203, and five v ^j counts ui theft
(auto

and

violation

four

(4) firearms), all second degree

Utah Code Ann.

I "it1

I'M

felonies,

.-m i fi.K m )

in

in i i ^ ( ,

State Prison to serve the indeterminate sentences provided by law.
Judge Brian ordered consecutive sentences on al1 counts
ami v inihrjiicem MI11

I i IJIIIr i MI! • i w<-kripnii.

iincluding

All proceedings occurred in

the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County, State
of Utah.
On September b,

xwu

Appellant, through his trial counsel,

filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court
On: i N o v e m b e r

'

I'l'id

IIIII

i< i u n j u s t 1 : !

wiri1

i i i h c , t i 11 m I i < m I h u

| uipnsps

of preparing this appeal.
C.

Disposition in the Trial Court!
A Judgment tiiui Commitment in the case was entered by the

Court

August 26, 1996, committing Appellant to the Utah State

Prison for a indeterminate term, no*

exceed tivi

(' | yedi i m t;o

life for Count 1, Murder, a first degree felony; one to five (1-5)
years for use of a dangerous weapon, to run consecutively to all
counts; and five (5) sentences of one to fifteen (1-15) years for
each of the Theft charges, counts 2 through 6, all sentences to run
consecutively to all others.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

On the late evening of August 7, 1995, the deceased body of
Appellant's wife, Kayleen Jones Scales, was discovered.
133)

(Tr. 129-

She was found in her bed in the trailer she shared with

Appellant on the Jones' family ranch, near Coalville, Utah.

She

had been shot multiple times in the head by a small caliber weapon,
(Tr. 227), through a pillow that covered her head.

(Tr. 323)

Earlier that morning, Appellant had borrowed the car belonging
to Mabel Jones, the victim's grandmother, indicating he had to go
to work, claiming his car was disabled.
nearby on the ranch.

(Tr. 183-84)

She lived

The victim's mother, Kay, also lived a couple

of hundred yards away from the Scales trailer.
Found
belonging

missing
to Wade

from

the

Jones,

trailer

were

the victim's

four

brother.

(4) firearms
(Tr.

137)

Appellant's wallet was in the trailer which had been found locked.
Appellant left Summit County and was apprehended the next day
in Reno, Nevada, still in Mabel Jones' car, with two (2) of Wade

6

J f ill I P « -

"

I 1 i fJI 1 I III,1

III I I

I I III

I III IIHIII III

11 III III

1,

firearms, including the Ruger 22 that w a s determined to be the
(r

weapon that caused the victim's death

I

Appellant w a s incarcerated in Coalville, awaiting trial.
February

1996, upon learning his first wife had just

c a n c e r , Appellant

iJiidei tool : a II HHI

at

In

died

s >>me I.oi. Ly • one ( 4 I! J i.,

The alarmed prosecutor petitioned the Court to commit Appellant to
the State Hospital for evaluation, which it d J ^

^ e e Addenduir *v

Appellant thereafter took a nose clxve, and M i . Fratto attempted to
withdraw as counsel for Appellant

(See Addendum B ) But the Court

denied

needed bo t:i: ::i a ]

f ::)i:

all intents and purposes, incommunicado

There w a s no attorney-

cl lent

obtained

relationship,

nor had the Court

Appellant's right to counsel.

a waiver of

(See Addendum L j

A Motion to Sever was filed, argued and denied.

(Tr. June ,1 0

charged and sentenced to consecutive sentences ±n prison. (See
Addendum ^ )
SUMMARY QF ARGUMEM1
The Court erred in failing to sever count one

Murder,

from counts t w o through six („! (i),, Auto -mid Firearms Theft
7

The

counts were improperly joined, contrary to Rules 9.5, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure and Title 76, Chapter 1, Section 401, Utah Code
Ami. (1953 as amended).

Rules 9.5 provides for multiple offenses

being charged in a single Information.

However, a single criminal

episode as defined in 76-1-401, must only apply to conduct closely
related in kind and incident to an attempt or accomplishment of a
single criminal objective.

That was not the case here.

There was

inconclusive evidence that the homicide and theft counts were
closely related in time.

Notwithstanding that, the theft charges

were not incident to the accomplishment of the homicide and would
not be otherwise admissible in the homicide trial any more than the
homicide would be admissible in the trial on theft.
2.

Appellant did not receive effective assistance of counsel

because the attorney-client relationship between Mr. Fratto and
Appellant

never developed

effective advocacy.

to the minimal point

required

for

For whatever reasons, Appellant and his trial

counsel established no trust.

Counsel recognized the impossibility

of trying to fashion a defense in such a situation and moved to
withdraw from any further representation of Appellant.
denied that motion and the case proceeded to trial.

The Court

Appellant and

counsel had had no meaningful communication since April of 1996.

8

r I in j i i i .-ii" II

slli

ni ni II 1 II

I nihil' i-1

I in »f»ii

i l l II in I I II

l

i l hili

ni i i

i l l Ill

i

I-

'r M I I I i . f II

appointed to prepare Appellant's defense.
3

The Court erred

in laiJiiiqi

1

obtain a knowing

intelligent waiver of Appellant's riglit to counsel after finding
that Appellant was not and would not cooperate with his counsel in
prepar.

.

aefense

self-representation
representation,

MM. 1

wii 1,

I m i l riiim nml

I

or worse, electing

h

|pj»eJ liiiiiill

IIPII|UPS:.

to go forward

for which a waiver ~* *l_Kr ~A'~h+-

with _IL

+-~ counsel is

ensure Appellant's waiver was knowing and intelligently made.
A

for

The evidence was insufficient to sustain the convicti on

murder

sufficiency.

and reasonable
There

minds

would

was insufficient

differ

evidence

regarding its
that

caused I i •. i 11 I i» s. i lea t h

Appellant
11 Appe 1 J 111

did cause his wife'*; death, the evidence, when reasonably and
dispassionately viewed, is that of manslaughter.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAIL
FROM THE THEFT CHARGES.
The question here is whether the theft of the car and guns was
indeed part o * a single criminal episode precipitated w

9

murder,

and the answer is no.

Rule 9.5 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,

allows joinder, but the criteria must adhere to, and fit, the
definition in Title 76-1-401 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended);
i.e., to all conduct closely related in time and incident to an
attempt or accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Joinder in this case was prejudicial.

In State v. Germonto,

868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993), the court dealt with a single criminal
episode involving joinder of a forgery with a robbery and homicide.
The forgery occurred almost immediately after the robbery and
homicide

and

the

court

found

the offenses

shared

a

single

objective, to obtain property from the victim.
Here, we don't know when the homicide occurred, but there is
a possibility of at least twelve (12) hours of elapsed time before
Appellant obtained the car and guns and left.

There was no

evidence the homicide was committed in order to facilitate stealing
the car and guns, or that it was done to facilitate
obtaining property from the victim.

The car and guns didn't belong

to the victim.
The State argued that the evidence of the thefts would have
been admissible in the murder case anyway because it was evidence
of fleeing from a murder and disposing of the murder weapon, which
can support an inference of a guilty mind.
10

Fleeing is not an

H 1 Biiifiiil

Ill il ni ni mi in i l l M

"I" lh i'"

f rii i

1 I in 11 A p p e I 1 (in ml

I <" I I

I l i e M 'erne

H I I Il s i I I ill

the gun was enough to allow the State to offer their inference t;e
the jury.
The Court abused its discretion in agreeing the thefts would
be admissible anyway because there was no evidence to support the
"closeness

in

I J in*-'

n i fiii i i tint i l l

Assuming H I yiiHiulu

Illicit

I.1JP M I I

died at 9:30 p.m. the day before her discovery, then the Appellant
didn't leave in the car with the guns for some twelve (12) hours.
11

I i i' IN 11"

f 1 p e l iiij

I mi

( " K J I I 111 I e i I in

in qtjn

|,>

It

how distant in time the two acts were.
Appellant did not steal from the victim so there was no single
criminal objective, such as obtaining property from the victim.
State V. Cornish, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977), the court found
joined because
the two incidents were separated in time by a day and had separate
objectives.

unnecessary * JJ

State

motive, identit\ , .ntent,

anything else. The fact that the Ruger was recovered and traced to
Appellant fulfilled that showing.
Tf was not: necessary to introduce evidence of unrelated thefts
tc j::: i n >"•: Apije1 Lai :t t I c::i ] ] eel 1 i :i s w i l'e.
11

It would not be permissible to allow evidence that Appellant
may have killed his wife to prove he took the car and failed to
return it, and also took and sold the guns.

The State would not

need to show the Ruger was used to kill Kayleen Scales in order to
prove Appellant took it from Wade Jones with intent to deprive him
of it.

The joinder was improper and it prejudiced the Appellant.

The

homicide

and

thefts were

insufficiently

related

temporal proximity, and did not comprise a single objective.
was the case in State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1977).

in

Such
In

denying defendant's request for joinder, the court found the two
crimes,

aggravated

robbery and kidnapping of passengers, had

distinct differences in time, distance, location

(2 different

counties) and purpose. Defendant had taken a cop's gun, and while
running from that, kidnapped passengers he had picked up.
The court in State V, GQtfrey, 598 P.2d 132 (Utah 1979)
reiterated the purpose of joinder is to conserve judicial resources
and time, but warned to take care it is not misused to deprive
defendant of a fair trial.
"...by joining different offenses so that evidence
concerning charges unrelated in time and nature,
which would normally not be admissible upon a
trial, could be admitted as to the multiple
offenses in an effort to stigmatize the defendant
and thus make it questionable that the jury would
give a fair and dispassionate consideration to the
12

evidence on the first charge."
(citations omitted).

908 P.2d at 1328

The court is saying these joined offenses must relate in time
and be similar in nature/ design, and victim.

That is not the case

here.
The court

in State v. Hagar

735 P. 2d

44

(Utah

1987),

emphasized the objective of severance is to promote justice.

In

State v, Kerekesr 622 P.2d, 1161 (Utah 1980), the court emphasized
the trial court must also determine if the probative value of the
joined cases outweigh the probative effect.

Here, the court just

agreed with the prosecutor's conclusions and made no such finding.
(Tr. (6-10-95) p. 20-23) (Addendum D)
The Kerekes court cited State v. Gibson, 565 P.2d, 783 (Utah
1977) in noting the sound policy of the law that evidence of prior
crimes may not be admitted to show the propensity of a defendant to
commit another crime.
"But in situations where evidence of other crimes and wrongs
is particularly relevant (emphasis added) in proving a specific
element of the crime (emphasis added) for which the defendant is on
trial, the evidence may be allowed for that purpose.

(Citing State

V, Lopez, 451 P.2d, 880 (Utah 1978), State v. Dicksonr 361 P.2d,
412 (Utah 1961), 662 P.2d at 1165.

13

The evidence of the thefts was not of particular relevance to
prove a specific element of homicide.

Fleeing (or leaving the

scene) is not an element of the offense, but merely a circumstance
that can be considered for purposes of inferring a guilty mind.
It was prejudicial to Appellant, and abuse of discretion, for
the court to join these offenses merely to enable the State to
offer an inference of guilt, not to prove any specific element of
homicide.

The evidence would have been such that the State could

have offered

that inference anyway, just from the fact that

Appellant left the scene and sold the Ruger.

Theft charges were

unnecessary to establish that.
The joinder of these counts stigmatized the Appellant and
prejudiced his chance of a fair trial on the homicide charge.

This

Court should reverse that trial court order severance, and order a
new trial.
POINT II
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Since this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
raised for the first time on direct appeal, the Court must decide
whether defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of
counsel as a matter of law.

state v. Tennysonr 850 P.2d, 461, 466

(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
14

Ordinarily, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are
addressed

by collateral

attack in habeas corpus proceedings;

however, in some circumstances, the claims may be raised on appeal.
State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Such

circumstances exist when the defendant is represented by new
counsel on appeal and the trial record is adequate on the issues.3
Government of the Virgin Island v. Zepp. 748 F.2d 125, 133-34 (3d

Cir. 1984).

These circumstances are present for the Court to

review the ineffectiveness claim raised on appeal in this case.
In

cases

involving

claims of

ineffective

assistance of

counsel, Utah courts have adopted the two-part test of Strickland
v, Washingtonr 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984):

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance
was deficient. This requires a showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable. See also State v. Tempiinr 805 P.2d,
182, 186 (Utah 1990).

3

See Addendum B; Motion to Withdraw, and attached Affidavit
submitted by trial counsel on May 2, 1996; and Addendum C.
15

In short, to demonstrate ineffectiveness, the defendant must show
that there was a deficient performance which resulted in prejudice.
The deterioration of the attorney-client relationship rendered
Appellant's counsel ineffective as a matter of law.

The Court

erred by denying counsel's Motion to Withdraw.
As noted, the right to effective assistance of counsel is of
constitutional

magnitude.

In

this

instance,

the

deficient

performance came about due to counsel's failure to establish even
a minimal amount of trust, and at least a functional level of
repore with Appellant, such that lines of communication would be
open and Appellant could meaningfully participate in, and aid
counsel in his defense.
According to counsel's Affidavit in support of his motion to
Withdraw, there was no confidence expressed in counsel by the
Appellant from the outset.

Apparently, there were disagreements

regarding a motion for change of venue, among other difficulties.
Appellant apparently felt counsel was involved in the commitment to
the State Hospital against Appellant's will.
filed against counsel.

A Bar complaint was

Appellant tried to fire counsel.

Regardless of the cause(s), the attorney-client relationship
never got off the ground.

By May 1, 1996, the Appellant and his

counsel were no longer communicating.
16

That made preparing for a

murder trial a joke.

Again, it matters not who was to blame, or

who was right or wrong.

Perhaps Appellant was wrong or mistaken.

Perhaps he wasn't as competent as he was found to be.
counsel

did

or did

confidence in him.

not do something
It matters not.

to shatter

Maybe

Appellant's

The point is, counsel acted

properly in moving to withdraw, and the Court erred in not allowing
it.
Appellant's written request to counsel for more information
regarding his case, as reflected in counsel's Affidavit, is further
confirmation
attorney.

of

a

Counsel

relationship.

nonworking

relationship

with

recognized

the

rightfully

his

defense

nonexistent

He knew he could not formulate a defense.

He could

not adequately represent appellant.
Appellant indicates he was unaware of the recovery of the
Ruger until the June 10 hearing when the prosecutor mentioned it
and that ballistic tests were being conducted.

(See Tr. p. 10)

Because appellant was so alienated from counsel, no meaningful
efforts could be made to resolve the matter short of trial, in
light of the new evidence. Counsel knew that he would not be able
to properly defend appellant and said so.
This was an egregious, severely strained situation that would
have been avoided by allowing counsel to withdraw.
17

Instead, it

festered all the way to trial, to Appellant's prejudice.
The Courtf s rationale for denying the Motion to Withdraw was
inadequate to override Appellant's right to counsel.

Any delay or

inconvenience

counsel

created

inconsequential

by

a

substitution

of

is

in light of the Court's obligation to ensure

Appellant is adequately represented, especially when facing such
serious charges.
With Appellant and counsel incommunicado, Appellant did not
aid in his defense.

He did not testify at trial.

manslaughter defense was available.

Perhaps a

It was error as a matter of

law for the Court to allow the trial to go forward with counsel
handcuffed.

Perhaps a defense was compromised.

The Court should have appointed different counsel.
recognized he couldn't do his job.

Counsel

This Court should find as a

matter of law that Appellant did not have effective assistance of
counsel.

Counsel was forced into the role of "mere presence of

counsel."

That's not the test.

The Court's ruling on the motion

should be reversed and the matter should be remanded back to the
trial court for a new trial.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO OBTAIN A KNOWING
AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
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If this Court decides Appellant willfully compromised his own
defense by not cooperating with his counsel, then the trial court
erred in not obtaining a knowing and intelligent waiver of the
right

to counsel

from Appellant.

Instead, it just ordered

everybody to proceed. (See Addendum C)

Trial courts have an

affirmative duty to determine that a defendant

who chooses self-

representation, does so knowingly and intelligently.

State v.

Drobelr 815 P.2d 724 (Ut. Ct. App. ) cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1991), citing Faretta v. California. 442 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct.
2525, 456.Ed 2d 562 (1975),
Appellant never openly requested self representation, but by
not cooperating with counsel (whether his reasons were valid or
not) he, in fact, was waiving an important right to professional
counsel.

The Court failed to determine that appellant was doing so

knowingly and intelligently.
At the hearing on counsel's Motion to Withdraw, the Court
merely found no basis for Appellant's noncooperation with his
lawyer, and that there was no reason to believe he would cooperate
with any attorney (See order, Addendum C).

But the court did not

find Appellant was doing so knowingly and intelligently.

The Court

did not take the Appellant's questionable mental health into
account, but just ordered that counsel prepare for trial with or
19

without

Appellant's

cooperation.

That

is

tantamount

to

a

conclusion that Appellant had elected self-representation or worse
yet, no representation.

The Court's failure to obtain a knowing

waiver of that right was reversible error as a matter of law.
This

determination

regarding

a

waiver

turns

"upon

the

particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including
the background, experience, and conduct of the accused."

Johnson

v, Zerbstr 304 U.S. 458, 469, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461
(1938); United States v. Padella, 819 F.2d 952, 958 (10th Cir.
1987)
In State v. Framptonr

737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987), the

Supreme Court identified a penetrating, on-the-record colloquy
between defendant and the trial court as the preferred method of
ascertaining whether defendant understands the risks of selfrepresentation and, therefore, chooses that option knowingly and
intelligently.

737 P.2d at 187.

Here there was no colloquy nor any mention of defendant's
mental health.4
In Drobel the court noted:

4

Even though Appellant was found competent to stand trial, his
mental health, as reflected by his counsel's representations of
their problems, was still in question.
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"...we believe that the question of mental
competence
to
elect
self-representation
is
encompassed within the requirement that the choice
to exercise that right be knowing and intelligent."
815 P.2d at 734
Here the court made no inquiries nor any findings regarding an
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.

It was patently absurd

for the Court to order counsel to prepare a defense in a murder
case with or without his client's cooperation.
The Court, for all intents and purposes, found that Appellant
was, in fact, choosing self-representation.

In fact, his counsel

was then acting under court orders to proceed.
properly represent his client in a vacuum.

Counsel cannot

This Court should find

the trial court failed to obtain a waiver of this important
constitutional right as a matter of law, and remand for a new
trial,
POINT IV
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION
This case bears a close resemblance to the situation in ££a±£
v. Pfitree. 659 P.2d, 443 (Utah 1983).
In Petree the court noted that even though the evidence was
sufficient to prove that the death of the victim involved criminal
activity, it was not sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable
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doubt, that defendant caused the victim's death intentionally and
knowingly.
Even when viewing the evidence in this case in a light
favorable to the verdict, it was nevertheless insufficient to
sustain a conviction of murder.

Reasonable minds would differ

regarding the sufficiency of this evidence.
The evidence here was that Appellant and his wife were living
together in a trailer on her family's ranch.

There was no evidence

that Appellant mistreated or abused his wife.

In fact, he may have

rescued her from destitution.

The victim's mother

(Tr. 143-144)

testified to briefly hearing raised voices coming from the Scales
trailer some 200 yards away from her home about 24 hours before the
victim was discovered.

(Tr. 167)

No motive for an intentional

murder was ever shown. Motive is not an element of murder, but in
a circumstantial evidence case such as this, a motive becomes
essential as a reason for the jury to make certain inferences from
the

circumstances

presented.

Without

direct

evidence

of

intentional murder, motive or lack of, looms large.
The evidence is that some time, perhaps a long time, after the
death of the victim—time of death was never established—Appellant
borrowed Mabel Jones' car under false pretenses and left the scene.
He failed to return the car and was apprehended in Reno, Nevada,
22

still in Ms, Jones' car, with two (2) of Wade Jones' firearms in
the trunk.

He sold two (2) firearms, including the Ruger 22,
i

i

leaving a receipt for one of them.
There was no direct evidence that he killed his wife and even
if defendant did cause the death, it was manifestly insufficient to
prove that he did so intelligently, and knowingly, as was charged
in the complaint.
The Court reverses a jury verdict for insufficient evidence
when, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that
verdict, it is sufficiently inconclusive, or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted fPetree,
659 P.2d at 443).
In Petree, evidence that defendant was the last person to be
seen with the victim, that defendant left town after the victim's
disappearance was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that he caused the victim's death, or, if he did, that he did
so intelligently and knowingly.

Defendant even made a statement

regarding the victim's death in the context of a dream.

The Court

said that was still not enough.
Here, Appellant also left town in a car he had initially
borrowed, and also took and sold a couple of firearms including the
23

weapon that had apparently been used to kill his wife.

That fact,

like the statement in Petreer still does not add up to enough
evidence that Appellant committed

an intentional murder.

He

certainly may have caused his wife's death, but the evidence, as
seen in any light, was of a crime of passion, manslaughter - what
with the torn-up marriage certificate, (Tr. 318), the messy room,
the multiple shots and the very real possibility that Appellant
stayed with the body of his wife for many hours before leaving - it
is evidence that everything flew out of control, rather than a
setting for deliberate murder, in order to steal grandmother's car
and take brother's weapons?
Here, we don't know when the victim was killed, we don't know
why she was killed.

We don't know what was said, we don't know who

tore up the marriage certificate, or why.

We don't know how long

Appellant remained on the scene after the death.
left.

We only know he

He borrowed the car from Mabel Jones, as opposed to just

taking it without her knowledge.

We don't know if he was fleeing

a murder or numbed by shock and confusion.
Some of this only Appellant can tell us.

But he and counsel

were estranged from the beginning and no defense was presented.
(See points 2, 3 above.)
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The State argued that whatever Kay Jones heard the day before
was the premise, the motive for a violent, depraved murder, and
that Appellant's intent was to suddenly kill his wife, steal a car,
steal guns and run.
grief and fear.

He also may have been out of his mind with

Lacking any reasonable motive, reasonable minds

would have enough doubt about this evidence to differ as to intent.
The evidence more correctly points to manslaughter.
CONCLUSION
Appellant submits the improper joinder of the charges against
him prejudiced his case.

The Court erred in denying severance

because the charges did not qualify as a single criminal episode.
The Court should reverse that finding, order severance, and
grant a new trial.
Appellant

received

ineffective assistance of counsel, as

verified by counsel in a Motion to Withdraw, and the Court erred in
denying that motion. Appellant and counsel had no attorney-client
relationship that was in any way conducive to the preparation for
and

presenting

of

a

defense,

circumstantial evidence case.

especially

in

light

of

this

This Court should find as a matter

of law that Appellant lacked effective assistance and grant a new
trial.

25

The Court failed to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of
Appellant's right to counsel after finding that Appellant was not
cooperating with his counsel.

This was tantamount to finding

Appellant was requesting self-representation or no representation,
which requires a knowing, intelligent waiver on the record of the
right to counsel. This Court should find that failure to obtain a
waiver is reversible error.
The evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction
wherein reasonable minds would differ on the sufficiency therein
and the Court should reverse the jury finding, and either remand
the matter for a new trial, or enter a finding of manslaughter on
count one and remand the matter for resentencing.

Dated this ^ - ^

day of
of ^yZ^ujZsi*^
day
^*M*<uj3U<stsy

, 1997.
,

Respectfully submitted,

<^~-

MANNY GARCIA
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I, MANNY GARCIA, hereby certify that I have caused to be
delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's Office,
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah
<ZJ~u<^*

,

1997.
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day of

ADDENDUMS A - E

A Q}Q/G* lr\ d u m

A

Robert W. Adkins, #0028
Summit County Attorney
Summit County Courthouse
P. O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
Telephone (801) 336-4468
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PETITION FOR INQUIRY INTO
MENTAL CONDITION OF DEFENDANT

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF
VS.

CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 FS

CARL WILLIAM SCALES,
DEFENDANT.

Robert W. Adkins files this Petition pursuant to the provisions of Title 77, Chapter 15,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and alleges as follows:
1. That he is the duly elected, qualified, and acting County Attorney of Summit County,
State of Utah.
2.

That defendant, Carl William Scales, is presently housed in the Summit County

Jail awaiting trial, which is presently scheduled for May 29, 1986, on the charge of Murder.
3.

That Carl William Scales, age 34, may be mentally ill, and is an immediate

danger to himself, and should be committed to the Utah State Hospital pursuant to the provisions
of Section 77-15-1 et seg, UCA 1953, as amended. Such belief is based upon the following
facts:

A.

Carl William Scales has not eaten any food for the past 41 days. Carl

William Scales is drinking coffee, water, and juice, but has refused any other nutrients.
B.

Carl William Scales is charged with murdering his second wife, Sheila

Kayleen Scales.
C.

Carl William Scales discovered approximately 41 days ago that his first

wife had passed away, apparently from cancer. After receiving that news, Carl William
Scales has refused to eat solid food.
D.

Carl William Scales is apparently depressed over the death of his first

wife. Carl William Scales told jailer Gale Pace that he wants to experience the suffering
that his first wife experienced while she was dying of cancer, and for that reason has
refused to eat.
E.

The jail staff is concerned about the depression of Carl William Scales,

and his deteriorating physical condition. The jail staff has attempted to convince him to
eat. but Carl William Scales refuses to do so.
F.

The jail staff has made arrangements for Carl William Scales to be

examined by a physician, but Carl William Scales has refused to see or be examined by
the physician.
G.

The Summit County jail staff has made arrangements for Carl William

Scales to be seen by a mental health professional from Valley Mental Health, but Carl
William Scales refuses to be seen or examined by any mental health professional.
4.

Carl William Scales is represented by his attorney, Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., 431

South 300 East, #101. Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, (801) 322-1616.

5.

The Summit County jail staff know of no other relative for Carl William Scales.

6.

Affiant, upon information and belief, alleges that this court should fix a time for

an examination by the court into the mental condition of the defendant to determine whether the
defendant is competent to proceed with the criminal charges that have been filed against him.
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that this court order the said Carl William Scales be
committed to the Utah State Hospital for a period not to exceed 30 days for observation and
treatment and upon termination of such commitment, the said Carl William Scales shall be
returned to his original custody and thereupon this court shall proceed with the examination into
the mental condition of the said Carl William Scales to detennine whether he is competent to
proceed.
DATED this

day of March, 1996.

ROBERT W. ADKINS
SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

day of March, 1996.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My commission expires:

_

Robert W. Adkins, #0028
Summit County Attorney
Summit County Courthouse
P. O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
Telephone (801) 336-4468
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF
VS.

:

ORDER FOR EXAMINATION INTO
THE MENTAL CONDITION OF
DEFENDANT

:

CARL WILLIAM SCALES,

:
DEFENDANT

CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 FS

:

A verified Petition having been filed pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 15, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, in the above-entitled matter asserting upon information and belief
that Carl William Scales may be incompetent to proceed and that the said Carl William Scales
is presently being held at the Summit County Jail in Coalville, Utah, it is hereby
ORDERED that the said Carl William Scales be committed to the Utah State Hospital
for a period of 30 days for observation and treatment, and tiiat upon termination of said
commitment, that the said Carl William Scales shall be returned to the Summit County Jail.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all proceedings pending against Carl William Scales
shall be stayed until the proceedings to determine his mental condition are terminated.

03/21/1996

20:43

SUMMIT COUNTY ATTY

8013365105
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to affect said examination, the said Carl William
Scales shall be transported to the Utah State Hospital at Provo, Utah, by the Summit County
Sheriffs Department, as soon as possible, to be held during such examination, and upon
completion thereof, return the said Carl William Scales to the Summit County Jail to be there
held awaiting further order of this court.
DATED this

day of March, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

rPAT B/ BRIAN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid,
this 22nd day of March, 1996, to Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., attorney for defendant, at 431 South 300
East, #101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.
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Robert W. Adkins, #0028
Summit County Attorney
Summit County Courthouse
P. O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
Telephone (801) 336-4468
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:
PLAINTIFF

VS.

PETITION TO FORCE-FEED
DEFENDANT, CARL WILLIAM
SCALES

:

CARL WILLIAM SCALES,

:
DEFENDANT.

CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 FS

:

COMES NOW plaintiff, by and through its attorney, Robert W. Adkins, Summit County
Attorney, and respectfully shows the court:
1.

That T am die duly elected, qualified, and acting county attorney of Summit

County, Utah.
2.

That defendant, Carl William Scales, is presently housed in the Summit County

Jail awaiting trial, which is presently scheduled for May 29, 1986, on the charge of Murder.
3.

Carl William Scales has not eaten any food for the past 41 days. Carl William

Scales is drinking coffee, water, and juice, but has refused any other nutrients. Carl William
Scales is charged with murdering his second wife, Sheila Kayleen Scales. Carl William Scales

discovered approximately 41 days ago that his first wife had passed away, apparently from
cancer. After receiving that news, Carl William Scales has refused to eat solid food. Carl
William Scales is apparently depressed over the death of his first wife. Carl William Scales told
jailer Gale Pace that he wants to experience the suffering that his first wife experienced while
she was dying of cancer, and for that reason has refused to eat. The jail staff is concerned about
the depression of Carl William Scales, and his deteriorating physical condition. The jail staff
has attempted to convince him to eat, but Carl William Scales refuses to do so.
4.

The jail staff has made arrangements for Carl William Scales to be examined by

a physician, but Carl William Scales has refused to see or be examined by the physician.
5.

Carl William Scales is represented by his attorney, Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., 431

South 300 East. #101. Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, (801) 322-1616.
I
6.
The Summit County jail staff know of no other relative for Carl William Scales.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that this court issue and Order directing the Utah State
Hospital, the Summit County Jail, or any other facility having the custody of Carl William
Scales to force-feed Carl William Scales interveinously or otherwise.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 1996.

Robert W. Adkins
Summit County Attorney

e n & u, TV\

E>

JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. #1121
Attorney for Defendant
431 South 300 East, #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-1616

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 951300063 FS

CARL WILLIAM SCALES,

Judge Pat Brian

Defendant.
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR., herein moves the court for leave to
withdraw as attorney of record in the above-entitled matter, on the
grounds and for the reasons that counsel is unable to adequately
and effectively represent the defendant as fully set forth in the
Affidavit of Counsel, attached hereto.
DATED this

A"

1996.

JRr
Defendant
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JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. #1121
Attorney for Defendant
431 South 300 East, #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-1616

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 951300063 FS

vs.

Judge Pat Brian

CARL WILLIAM SCALES,
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
J

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

SS.

:

JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR., upon his oath, deposes and says the
following:
1.

That I am the attorney of record representing Carl W.

Scales, in the above-entitled matter. I was appointed to represent
the

defendant

pursuant

to

a

contract

to

provide

said

representation.
2.

That trial in the above matter is scheduled for May 29,

1996, and a hearing on motions is scheduled for May 13, 1996.
3.

That pursuant to the prosecutor's Petition For Inquiry

Into Mental Condition of Defendant, defendant was sent to the Utah
State Hospital.

Following that evaluation and the return of the
1

report indicating defendant's competency to proceed with trial, a
hearing was held on April 22, 1996.
defendant

was

David

West ley,

who

Present with counsel for the
has

been

employed

as

an

investigator to assist in the above-entitled matter. The defendant
indicated to affiant, at this hearing, that he did not wish to
speak to him or cooperate in the preparation of the case.

The

defendant expressed to the court that he did not want to proceed
with affiant as his counsel.
4.

That on or about April 25, 1996, a copy of a letter sent

by defendant to the Utah Bar Association was received by affiant.
In that letter defendant requests the Bar assist in changing the
venue of the legal proceedings pending in this matter and outlines
complaints with the investigator, aforesaid, and with affiant.
Those complaints include a belief that counsel conspired with the
prosecutor to have defendant committed to the hospital for the
evaluation.

Such allegations indicate a deterioration of the

relationship between counsel and defendant, which relationship is
necessary for adequate and effective representation.
5.

That on May 1, 1996 I attempted to have contact with

defendant at the Summit County Jail.
was refused by him.

My request for an interview

I subsequently received

from defendant,

further correspondence, dated April 29, 1996, in which defendant
requests copies of "information relating to my case" and a specific
list of information, including reports, evaluations and laboratory
results. This request is a further indication of the deterioration
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of the relationship and defendant's desire to have affiant withdraw
as the counsel in the matter.
6.

That

it is affiant's

information

and belief

that

defendant has independently filed motions, including a Motion for
Change of Venue in the above matter.
affiant copies of these pleadings.

Defendant has not sent

The filing of this motion and

the failure to send a copy indicate an unwillingness to cooperate
with counsel in preparation, a lack of trust, the deterioration of
the relationship

and a desire by defendant

to have

counsel

withdraw.
7.

That the foregoing make it impossible for counsel to

adequately and effectively represent defendant in the proceedings
pending before the Court.

DATED this

ft

day of

jJ/I &*{,<

1996.

;]
:I/\.il~—' 'Hi i/,

/

JOSgPH C.I/ FRATTO ; JR:
, Affiant
y
O-

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me this cjday of \ \V&.M
1996, in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.

vi

Notaiy Public
J
SHAUNA L WILLIAMS I
431 South 300 East #101 I
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 I

——

My Commission Expires •

JSS»iS

»

-- ,

Notary Public

|

Residing at Salt Lake County

My commission expires: " 7 / 0 7 / ^ ^
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Robert W. Adkins, #0028
Summit County Attorney
Summit County Courthouse
P. O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
Telephone (801) 336-4468
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

:
PLAINTIFF

VS.

:

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO WITHDRAW AND
GRANTING MOTION TO
CONTINUE

:
CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 FS

CARL WILLIAM SCALES,
Judge Pat B. Brian
DEFENDANT

:

The Motion of Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., for Leave to Withdraw as Attorney of Record in
the above-entitled matter, came on regularly for hearing on the 8th day of May, 1996, at the
hour of 8:30 a.m. The State of Utah was represented by Robert W. Adkins and Terry L.
Christiansen. Defendant appeared in person and with his attorney, Joseph C. Fratto, Jr. The
court having listened to the arguments of counsel and statements of defendant, and good cause
appearing therefore, it is
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion For Leave to Withdraw be, and the same hereby
is, denied. The basis for denial of said Motion is as follows: (1) Th& court had heretofore on
the 22nd day of January, 1996, granted Defendant's Motion to Terminate the Services of Backup

Public Defender, Glen A. Cook; (2) Defense counsel, Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., is an experienced,
qualified, and competent attorney to represent the defendant; (3) There is no legitimate basis for
the defendant's position of not wishing to speak with or cooperate with his court-appointed
counsel in the preparation of the case; and (4) There is reason to believe based on defendant's
past behavior he will cooperate or be satisfied with another attorney.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is continued from May 29, 1996, to July 9,
1996, at the request of defendant's counsel to enable him to prepare for trial with or without the
cooperation of defendant.
DATED this & / day of May, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

Pat B. Brian
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing this

day of

May, 1996, postage prepaid, to Joseph C. Fratto, attorney for defendant, at 431 South 300 East,
#101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.

'ZvsS

{^f/k/zM?-^
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JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. #1121
Attorney for Defendant
431 South 300 East, #101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-1616

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO SEVER COUNTS OF
THE AMENDED INFORMATION
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 951300063 FS

vs.

Judge Pat Brian

CARL WILLIAM SCALES,
Defendant.

CARL WILLIAM SCALES, by and through his attorney, JOSEPH C.
FRATTO, JR., herein moves the court, pursuant to Rule 12 and Rule
9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to sever and conduct a
separate trial for Count I charging Murder, and Counts II - VI
charging Theft, on the grounds and for the reasons that the
substance of these offenses do not constitute a single criminal
episode and incorporates the Memorandum in Support of Motion,
attached hereto.

DATED this

IO

, JHIJJ

day of

/

/
/

1996.

-

-—T

/ /

/

JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR.
Attorney 'for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of the
foregoing MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS and MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION, were delivered to Robert W. Adkins, Summit County
Attorney,
Courthouse,

Summit

County

Coalville,

Attorney's
Utah

84017,

Office,
this

•':-- ' ^ 7 /
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Summit
?

- .- ••.

County
day

of

Robert W. Adkins, #0028
Summit County Attorney
Summit County Courthouse
P. O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
Telephone (801) 336-4468
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:
PLAINTIFF

VS.

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SEVER

:
CRIMINAL NO. 951300063

CARL WILLIAM SCALES,

:
DEFENDANT.

:

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendant's Motion to Sever Counts II, III, IV, V and VI from Count I came on
regularly for hearing before the court on June 10, 1996. Defendant appeared in person and with
counsel, Joseph Fratto, Jr.; the State appeared through its attorney, Robert W. Adkins, Summit
County Attorney and Terry L. Christiansen, Assistant Summit County Attorney. The court
having considered the Motion and the pleadings submitted in support of and opposition to the
Motion, having heard the arguments of counsel, and having verbally entered its decision on the
record, hereby makes and enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Defendant stands accused of murdering his wife, Sheila Kayleen Jones Scales on or about
August 6 or 7, 1995.

2. The homicide is alleged to have been committed through the use of a .22 caliber
firearm.
3. That on August 7, 1995 at 9:00 a.m., the defendant went to the home of Mabel
Jones, who is the grandmother of the victim, Sheila Kayleen Jones Scales. The home of Mabel
Jones is located approximately 200 yards from the trailer where the defendant and the victim
resided, and where the body of Sheila Kayleen Jones Scales was discovered later on August 7,
1995.
4. Defendant asked Mabel Jones if he could borrow her automobile to travel to an area
called South Fork, which is just a few miles from the home of Mabel Jones in Summit County,
Utah. The defendant claimed that his wife's vehicle had thrown a rod, and that he needed to
borrow Mabel Jones' automobile.
5. Mabel Jones agreed to loan the defendant her automobile, so that he could travel to
South Fork.
6. Shortly thereafter, the defendant left the scene of the murder.
7. The State claims that at the time the defendant left the scene cf the murder on the
morning of August 7, 1995, that he took with him four firearms belonging to Wade Jones, those
being three 22 rifles and a 30-06 rifle.
8. The State claims that the murder weapon was one of the 22 rifles that defendant took
with him when he left the murder scene on the morning of August 7, 1995.
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9. The State claims that the defendant sold the 30-06 rifle and one of the 22 rifles in
Nevada on August 7, 1995 and August 8, 1995.
10. The State claims that the other two 22 rifles were found in the trunk of Mabel Jones'
vehicle when the defendant was arrested by the Nevada Highway Patrol on August 8, 1995 near
Reno, Nevada.
11. The trier of fact could draw a reasonable inference that the defendant committed the
act of murder, for which he is charged in Count I, by the fact that the defendant fled from the
murder scene.
12. Evidence of defendant's flight will be presented at the trial, and evidence as to how
defendant obtained possession of Mabel Jones' vehicle and that the defendant fled with four
firearms, when he left the murder scene, will be presented to the trier of fact as part of the
defendant's flight after allegedly committing the murder.
13. The State has and will argue that the flight was accomplished by the defendant
obtaining the vehicle from Mabel Jones and by taking the firearms to either finance defendant's
flight from the murder scene, or to dispose of evidence from the murder scene, the .22 caliber
rifle.
14. The events of the homicide, and the thefts of the automobile and the four firearms
are closely related in time and place.
15. The defendant allegedly fled the murder scene shortly after the death of Sheila
Kayleen Jones Scales and obtained the firearms from the trailer, in which the victim had been
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killed, and obtained the vehicle belonging to Mabel Jones, approximately 200 yards from the
scene of the murder.
16. Flight is a factor that the trier of fact can consider in deiermining the guilt or
innocence of the accused in this case.
17. If the theft counts were severed from the murder count, the State would still be able
to present its evidence regarding the theft of the vehicle and the firearms during the murder trial.
18. The thefts of the car and firearms are integral, as they relate to the commission of
the murder or flight after the commission of the murder.
19. It is proper to join the murder charge in Count I with the theft counts in Counts II
through VI inclusive.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. It is proper to join and to try Count I, Murder, with the Then charges as contained
in Counts II through VI inclusive of the Information.
2. Defendant's Motion to Sever should be denied.
DATED this

day of July, 1996.
BY THE COURT.

Pat B. Brian
District Court Judge
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Robert W. Adkins, #0028
Summit County Attorney
Summit County Courthouse
P. O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
Telephone (801) 336-4468
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

PLAINTIFF
VS.

:
:

CARL WILLIAM SCALES,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SEVER

CRIMINAL NO. 951300063

:

Judge Pat B. Brian
DI-I'liNDANT.

:

Defendant's Motion to Sever came on regularly for hearing on June 10,1996, before the
Honorable Pat B. Brian, Districi < \)Urt Judge. Defendant appeared in person and with counsel,
Joseph Fratto, Jr.; plaintiff appealed through Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attorney, and
Terry L. Christiansen, Assistam Summit County Attorney. The court considered defendant's
Motion, and the pleadings in support and opposition thereto, heard the arguments of counsel,
having heretofore made and eniuod its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being
fully advised in the premises, ii i-,
ORDERED, ADJUDGl-D AND DECREED that defendant's Motion to Sever be, and
the same hereby is, denied.

DATED this

day of July, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

Pat B. Brian
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct of the foregoing, postage prepaid, this
15th day of July, 1996, to Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., attorney for defendant, at 431 South 300 East,
#101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.
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Robert W. Adkins, #0028
Summit County Attorney
Summit County Courthouse
P. O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
Telephone (801) 336-4468
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT
PLAINTIFF
VS.
CARL WILLIAM SCALES,
D.O.B. 09-06-61

CRIMINAL NO. 951300063 FS
DEFENDANT.

On the 26th day of August, 1996, appeared Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attorney,
and Terry L. Christiansen, Assistant Summit County Attorney, Attorneys for the State of Utah,
and the defendant appeared in person and by counsel, Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted following a Jury Trial of the
offenses of Murder, a First Degree Felony, as charged in Countt I of the Information; Theft,
a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count II of the Information; Theft, a Second Degree
Felony, as charged in Count III of the Information; Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged
in Count IV of the Information; Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count V of the
Information; and Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count VI of the Information;
the court having asked if the defendant had anything to say why judgment should not be
pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the court,

IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State
Prison for a period of five years to life and is fined $10,000.00 as provided by law for the crime
of Murder, a First Degree Felony, as charged in Count I.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State
Prison for an indeterminate term of one to five years to run consecutively and not concurrently
for the use of a dangerous weapon in the commission or furtherance of the offense of Murder
for which defendant has been adjudged guilty.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State
Prison for a term of 1 to 15 years and is fined $10,000.00 as provided by law for the crime of
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count II; said sentenced to run consecutively with
the sentences imposed in Count I and the enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State
Prison for a term of 1 to 15 years and is fined $10,000.00 as provided by law for the crime of
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count III; said sentence to run consecutively with
the sentences imposed in Counts I and II, and the enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State
Prison for a term of 1 to 15 years and is fined $10,000.00 as provided by law for the crime of
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count IV; said sentences to run consecutively
with the sentence imposed in Counts I, II, and III and the enhancement for use of a dangerous
weapon.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State
Prison for a term of 1 to 15 years and is fined $10,000.00 as provided by law for the crime of

Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count V; said sentences to run consecutively with
the sentence imposed in Counts I, II, III, and IV and the enhancement for use of a dangerous
weapon.
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State
Prison for a term of 1 to 15 years and is fined $10,000.00 as provided by law for the crime of
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count VI; said sentences to run consecutively
with the sentence imposed in Counts I, II, III, IV, and V, and the enhancement for use of a
dangerous weapon.
IT IS ORDERED that the Summit County Sheriff, D. Fred Eley, take the said defendant,
without delay, to the Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, where said defendant shall then and there
be confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
DATED this 26th day of August, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

Pat B. Brian
District Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid,
this 26th day of August, 1996, to Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., attorney for defendant, at 431 South 300
East, #101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.
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THE STATE OF UTAH,
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CASE NO. 960745-CA
vs.
Priority No. 2
CARL WILLIAM SCALES,
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BRIEF QF APPELLANT
Appeal from judgment and conviction of Murder, a first degree
felony, Theft, a second degree felony, Theft, a second degree
felony, Theft, a second degree felony, Theft, a second degree
felony, Theft, a second degree felony, , in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge, presiding.
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